"The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force
must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon
as it has gripped the masses."
-- Karl Marx
"What is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable you to talk with
some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., & if it does not improve your
thinking about the important questions of everyday life."
-- Ludwig Wittgenstein
"An elucidation and defence of the central tenets of humanist Marxism is offered here via an
examination of Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) key ideas. At first sight the links between
the two approaches might seem tenuous given that little effort has been made to show the
social relevance of Wittgenstein's ideas despite the much-acclaimed philosophical revolution
brought about by his work. Instead Wittgenstein has become a pillar of the philosophical
establishment, respected for his philosophical purity, whereas Karl Marx (1818-1883), who
tried to show the relevance of philosophy to political life has been derided by professional
philosophers for this reason. (Marx's unpopularity among Anglo-Saxon philosophers could
be attributed to the dominance of empiricism in Anglo-Saxon thought.) The strong
commitment to the separation of philosophy from practice in Anglo-Saxon philosophy is
reflected in the fondness of Wittgenstein's disciples for logical puzzle-solving and the
superficial features of linguistic usage. It is perhaps not surprising that, with few exceptions,
philosophers and social scientists have failed to see the fundamental similarities between
the ideas of Marx and Wittgenstein. Indeed Marxism has been seen as alien to Anglo-Saxon
philosophy while Wittgenstein has been identified with this tradition. 'One of the greatest
misfortunes that can affect a writer of great intellectual seriousness and strong ethical
passions', as Janik and Toulmin have argued, 'is to have his ideas "naturalized" by the
English'. (Allan Janik and Stephen Edelson Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna, 1973. Janik and
Toulmin emphasise that, despite this Anglicisation, Wittgenstein's work was embedded in
a strictly Germanic tradition. To some extent the same fate befell G. W. F. Hegel, as Ernest
Gellner has observed: 'in Cambridge, Michael Oakeshott developed a water-colour variant
of Hegelianism designed mainly for the preservation of the amenities and privileges of rural
England'. E. Gellner, 'Hegel's last secrets', 1976) Comparing George Bernard Shaw and
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Janik and Toulmin observe that:
All the moral indignation, political barbs and social vitriol of George Bernard Shaw
were robbed of their power the moment the English public for which he wrote
pigeonholed him securely as an Irish wag and a comic playwright. And something of
the same fate has shaped the current reputation of Ludwig Wittgenstein - at any rate,
as he is seen by most professional English-speaking philosophers in Britain and
America. (A. Janik and S. Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna)
"Wittgenstein may have lent encouragement to this Anglicisation of his thought, thereby
obscuring his links with his German philosophical heritage, by claiming to have little
knowledge of the history of philosophy as if he developed his ideas in a vacuum, arriving on
the scene like Athena out of the head of Zeus. In fact he refers to numerous other
philosophers, including Plato, Augustine, Kant, Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard, in his work.
He was also immersed in the cultural and artistic debates of pre-war Austria. His remark
should therefore be taken either as a jest or as an over-statement of his philosophical
independence. Furthermore, in Culture and Value, Wittgenstein acknowledged that he was
part of the intellectual drift of his time rather than a solitary genius:
I think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think reproductively. I don't
believe I have ever invented a line of thinking. I have always taken one over from
someone else. I have simply straightaway seized on it with enthusiasm for my work
of clarification. That is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus,
Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me. (L. Wittgenstein, Culture and
Value)
"Wittgenstein's links with the University of Cambridge have tended to overshadow his
connections with German thought, even though during the period from 1908 to 1937 he spent
less than eight years in England, of which three were spent studying engineering at the
University of Manchester. Through his association with Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and
George Edward Moore (1873-1958), Wittgenstein has been identified with the English
empiricists. Yet many of his ideas, such as the need for a general critique of language
expressed in the Tractatus, had reached maturity before his contact with the University of
Cambridge and had their origins in the post-Kantian tradition dominating the pre-war
Viennese cultural milieu. The later writings also bear the imprint of these Austrian influences:
his abandonment of the representational view of language for a functional analysis in the
Investigations reflects the move away from ornamentation to functionality in architecture, as
well as the more direct influence of discussions with the economist Piero Sraffa (1898-1983).
In place of a general representational theory, Wittgenstein focused on the use of language
within a plurality of contexts and in doing so revealed an affinity with Karl Marx. This is reflected
in their approach to epistemological and philosophical problems which militates against the
erection of fixed dichotomies and antinomies, the endless classification, polarisation and
fragmentation characteristic of much Anglo-Saxon philosophy and instead appeals to the
practice of everyday life to solve philosophical problems. As Marx says:
We see how subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and materiality, activity and suffering,
lose their antithetical character, and thus their existence as such antitheses only within
the framework of society: we see how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses is
only possible in a practical way by virtue of the practical energy of man. Their resolution
is therefore by no means merely a problem of understanding, but a real problem of life,
which philosophy could not solve precisely because it conceived this problem as
merely a theoretical one. (K. Marx, 'Economic and philosophical manuscripts')
In a more jocular vein Marx writes:
Kant and Fichte soar to heavens blue
Seeking for some distant land,
I but seek to grasp profound and true
That which in the street I find. (K. Marx, 'On Hegel')
"But whilst it will be argued that Marx's remarks on ideology presuppose an epistemology
which is radically different from that of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, this is not wholly explicit in
his writings. It is only in the work of later humanist Marxists such as Georg Lukács (1885-
1971) and Lucien Goldmann (1913-1970) that this epistemology is more fully articulated.
(G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness; L. Goldmann, The Human Sciences and
Philosophy, Power and Humanism, Lukács and Heidegger) As Marxism embraces a set
of ideas which are constantly changing rather than fixed dogmas enshrined in textbooks,
we will consider the way in which contemporary Marxism, as well as Marx himself, has sought
to deal with philosophical and methodological problems. However, there are certain strands
within Marxism which emphasise Marx's rejection of humanism in favour of scientism and
which are in danger of reverting to an Anglicised conception of philosophy far removed from
practice. (See, for example, Louis Althusser, For Marx; John Hoffman, Marxism and the
Theory of Praxis) While Marx's work provides evidence for both interpretations, it will be
argued, however, that a humanistic approach, drawing heavily from Hegel's ideas, provides
a more fruitful source of concepts for the analysis of modern society. But to reject empirical
realism and to demonstrate Marx's debt to Hegel is not to reduce Marxism to idealism.
Neither Marx nor Hegel can be seen as idealist, for each seeks to transcend the distinction
between materialism and idealism.
In Humanist Marxism & Wittgensteinian Social Philosophy we will investigate the
epistemological assumptions underpinning Marx's account of ideology, employing
Wittgensteinian concepts to contrast it with its empirical realist counterpart. We will critically
examine the essence-appearance distinction in Marx's later theory of knowledge and the
work of more recent theorists. We will consider how Marxists and Wittgensteinian social
philosophers transcend the fact-value distinction, rejecting both extremes of scientism and
moralism. It will be argued that lhe Marxian-Wittgensteinian notion of a worldview is the most
appropriate notion for understanding the relationship between ideas and social life. We will
consider the problems of conventionalism and relativism arising from the notion of a
worldview and indicate a possible solution, using the notions of universality and practice.
We will deal with possible objections to a reconciliation between humanist Marxism and
Wittgensteinian social philosophy. We will attempt to distance Marx from Wittgenstein on
the basis of the materialism of Marx and the idealism of Wittgenstein. We will consider
objections a Marxist might raise against Wittgensteinian social philosophy. We will conclude
with a summary of the common approach to philosophical and methodological problems
shared by Marx and Wittgenstein. The discovery of connections between humanist Marxism
and Wittgenstein serves to clarify the philosophical basis of humanist Marxism while
demonstrating a more radical stream of thought than is normally associated with Wittgenstein.
Our aim will be to reconcile the two approaches, to establish the case for a 'Wittgensteinian
Marx' and a 'progressive Wittgenstein'."
-- Susan M. Easton, Humanist Marxism and Wittgensteinian Social Philosophy, 1983
