martinscottcatino's blog
- 26 posts
- 0 friends
- 7 comments
-
Updates from Afghanistan
AFGHANISTAN 2012
RUSTIC MOSQUE NEAR KABUL, 2012
27 April 2012: National Coalition of Afghanistan:
Met with Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (pictured below), who will most likely be the next president of Afghanistan. It was very interesting discussing the Karzai gov't, problems over the last 10 years, and the future of Afghanistan.
Dr. Abdullah served as the Foreign Minister for Pres. Rabbani, Karzai, and almost won the last presidential election. His insights on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India were enlightening.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Had an extraordinary opportunity to speak with the brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud, "the Lion of Panjshir," as he was called. He was the leader of the Northern Alliance, and a mujahideen commander in the anti soviet war/jihad. Very interesting discussion on the Northern Alliance, the heroic spirit of Massoud, and current events in Afghanistan. Pictured below with brother and a portrait of CDR Massoud in the background.
15 April 2012: Spring Offensive Begins:
Keep your head down, Battle Buddy. It is getting a little sporty where you are in the city. And thanks for sending me the email.
22 February 2012: The Koran Burning Incident and American Perspectives of Afghans.
One of the more disconcerting effects of this event is the negative views of Afghans held by many Americans, views that erode needlessly the war effort. Rather than focusing on the overwhelming sentiments of Afghans indicating a desire for peace, the media and attention of some Americans have focused on the violence. No doubt, this is a serious and sensitive subject, and the reactions of too many Afghans are violent, passionate, and reckless. This violent reaction manifested in killing and targeting of the innocent should be condemned. But our American reactions should likewise be checked and not allowed to irrationally affect a proper understanding of the war in Afghanistan. As one who works in Kabul and monitors Afghan perceptions on a daily basis, I believe the vast majority of Afghans want peace and security, and eschew violence and terrorism.
First, there is a very deep war weariness among Afghans who across the board want reconciliation and peace. Many Afghans are not only tired of the violence and destruction but want to see a united effort to build the country and not tear it apart.
Second, Afghans are more the victims of aggression than the actual victimizers. Much of the violence and insurgency is based in Pakistan, fomented and organized there, and operationally controlled in these tribal and border areas. If the Pakistan equation of this war was removed, the entire insurgency would be reduced to a minor problem more easily handled by law enforcement than military action.
Third, many Afghans have tasted the freedoms and progress created by linkage to the international community. Contrasted to the dark and oppressive years of Taliban rule, a moderate and modern future is far more attractive to the many diverse ethnic groups that make this country their sacred home.
Forth, Afghan women have not only embraced the freedoms and opportunity created through Coalition efforts, but are among the most ardent champions of it. I believe, without exaggeration, there is no other group more committed to a peaceful and progressive Afghan future than the woman of this ancient land. And there is no other group as concerned with the possibility of the loss of that freedom. Bolstered by an energetic civil society, emergent in new and creative ways, the women of Afghanistan will continue to play an important part in the overall success here.
It is a dark and impassioned moment in Kabul today, and probably will be for a short while. But after this passes, the very quiet and unassuming stroll of progress will traverse this beautiful land.
Be careful you do not overlook its graceful steps.
AFGHANISTAN 2011
Pictured above with Afghan National Police and US Forces during Operation United Front II, April 2011.
7 August 2011: Exploring the Psychological Terrain of the Insurgency
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has spent billions of dollars assessing, planning, intervening, reconstructing, supporting and reassessing Afghanistan. Amid the tireless and herculean efforts a relatively unexplored terrain remains: the psychological terrain of the enemy. War planners have made their assessment, but policy makers are slow to follow. The dogged determination, psychotic resolve, brutal pragmatism, hardening of attitudes through the expending of time and blood, all have create an enemy psychology that must be matched with an equally or superior resolve and policy.
First, the average insurgent may not be a martyr, and may be marginally associated with the hardliners, but the hardcore dominate the insurgency and shape its character and create its durability. It is meaningless to underscore that that many local insurgents are fighting as “accidental guerrillas,” people who are nominally committed, and that to local not idealistic causes. The hardliners are the driving force of the insurgency and will determine the course of success or failure. To play to the outer rings of this galaxy will only lead one to the black holes where only the defeated powers of the past float in eternal contempt for their naiveté. Until the hardliners are dealt with decisively and completely, this insurgency will continue.
Second, many insurgents are masters of the human terrain, having lived among the local population for decades. Given this tactical and local advantage, a requisite and symmetrical counter measure must be undertaken to dominate the local terrain and remove both the insurgent presence and its auxiliary (the subterranean support apparatus). Too often clearing operations designed to Clear, Hold, and Build become fruitless operations that in reality never get past the clearing stage.
Third, the unnecessary prolonging of the war through indecisive actions tends to create a culture of cynicism and hopelessness among Afghans that becomes increasingly difficult to reverse. Afghan culture, like other cultures, tends to form opinions early in an experience (i.e., war) and then remain fixed in those views despite the positive developments that take place in security and economic development. Wasting time creates more than a lack of efficiency, but an intoxicating delusion that is difficult to overcome unless increasing and disproportionate success awakes the public mind from such a stupor. The insurgent benefits from this public despair and knows how to manipulate it.
Fourth, the insurgent at times gains an asymmetrical advantage in that battlefield experience is requisite for field and organizational command. There is no equivalent of the “perfumed princes of the Pentagon” among the Quetta Shura. Only the bad to the bone rise to such positions. Given this psychological advantage in leadership, both horizontally and vertically, it is imperative that Coalition Forces match this force capability with an equally dedicated and experienced leadership seasoned in small wars and counter-insurgency.
US policy must be based not just in strategic realities, domestic political context, and economic realities, but also in the realities of the psychology of the enemy. Exploring the psychological terrain of the insurgency will lead to some very disturbing conclusions that will alter policy and practice, if taken seriously. Yet this Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is essential for victory.
31 July 2011: The Many Faces of the Enemy.
Scholars and observers of the insurgency in Afghanistan continue to debate the driving motives and messages that animate groups like the Taliban and Haqanni Network. This is no philosophical inquiry at stake but a reality check for American leaders on ground truths currently shaping the battle space in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater. A closer look at the conduct of these non-state soldiers reveals that there is no commitment among them to methods or principles rather a keen awareness of religion, nationalism, local-regional economics, and tribal identities dominate their activities because they appeal to a wide varity of Afghans. Moreover, the insurgents masterfully blend these socio-political influences into a unified operational plan that remains sensitive to local conditions as well as command and control (C2) issues.
The Taliban have successfully used Islam as a rallying cry against “the Western Infidel” while simultaneously killing popular and local mullahs who oppose the plans of the Quetta shura. Here is where the enemy excels: dominating the human terrain. Finding a logical and coherent plan works well in military science but not in the realities of Afghanistan. Managing the conflicting and contradictory actions of the operational environment is not as difficult given the isolation of villages in Afghanistan, and the Word of Mouth (WOM) communication systems that can be easily dominated and cajoled.
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has repeatedly preached that “money is a weapons system,” meaning that the use of donor aid, and the allocation of resources, and mobilization of, bring about consequences in the field that can degrade the enemy’s capabilities. But the insurgents are well aware of this factor and work hard to dominate the local, illegal, criminal, and informal economies that are linked heart and pocket to the local populations. Take one glaring example: the Opium Trade in Afghanistan. The enemy continues to dominate this market, using it as both financing for the insurgency and avenues of covert communication and movement, nationally and transnationally. The fact that the enemy dominates not only “an agricultural trade” that sweeps the entire south of the country, and is the leading export of Afghanistan, indicates the monumental success of their economic strategy.
Moreover, ISAF has not yet found the boldness or inventiveness to counter the freedom and intensity that animates the very viability of insurgent operations. Sure, we have decimated their local command structures, which they replace with less and less fervency for the moment. But operationally, the INS has no qualms about killing tribal leaders, power brokers, warlords, or whoever stands in their way. This bold expediency creates a momentum as power vacuums and time deficits ensue from indecision over replacements, lack of capable leaders and administration, and paralysis through intimidation. Military analysts have worn out the word “asymmetrical” but have not handled effectively the center or centers of gravity that drive the insurgency: sanctuary in Pakistan; the Opium Trade in Afghanistan; ideological illusions feeding off of the bad gov’t both locally and nationally, and more. Yet these are the very areas where Coalition Forces are trumped in symmtery.
The multi-faceted and multi-directional nature of the insurgency is intertwined with its multi-causal motives and methods. The net effect of insurgent operations are boldness and dynamism that create a momentum that will not be checked unless a countervailing strategy strikes the epicenters of this cancer while providing a viable government and security. Here is the heart of the asymmetry of this conflict.
18 July 2011: Farewell to GEN Petraeus.
Farewell to GEN Petraeus. Today is the ceremony marking the change of command. GEN Petraeus, or P4 as he is called in theater, gave his last Morning Update Brief yesterday. We, listening by video comms, knew it was a historical moment, perhaps the second big event of our tours: the first being the death of Usama Bin Laden. I will remember the brief encounters with him and his staff, the daily briefs we listened to, and the many decisions that he made, all acts demonstrating courage, intelligence, and consideration. His understanding of the battle space, the critical elements of counter-insurgency, and the need to press the enemy were evident daily. It was an honor to be a part of a unit that directly served his command. We now look forward to serving under GEN Allen, who will likewise accomplish much.
14 July 2011: Ethnic Conflicts in Afghanistan: A Troubled Future.
Spoke with a USAID worker a few days ago who was a Subject Matter Expert (SME) on ethnic conflict in Afghanistan. His insights were interesting and sharp. The Pashtun population has long been at odds with the Hazara and the Tajiks. The strife is based on a number of issues: historical grievances, religious differences, economic competition, and genuine issues over land, politics, and security. President Karzai, a Pashtun, has steadily increased Pashtun power at the expense of the Tajiks, a fact measured by the diminishing role of Tajiks in high ministerial posts in GIRoA (The Islamic Government of the Republic of Afghanistan). The Tajiks are not alone in considering their interests and security under attack by the Pashtuns. The Hazara have been in open conflict with the Kuchi, a nomadic Pashtun group, who have encroached upon Hazara lands, a problem that is perennial. And like other ethnic conflicts around the globe, this one becomes politicized and entangled in broader issues: not least the Taliban effort to create unrest and exploit the ensuing security gap.
Critical to the issue will be: 1. Just and equitable settlements by GIRoA; 2. Ethnic leaders pursuing a moderate and apolitical solution; and 3. Expert conflict resolution utilizing the very best skills of diplomats and aid workers. The efforts to resettle the Kuchi on land granted by GIRoA are a good start. My USAID worker friend is not so optimistic. He believes the ethnic tensions could lead to nothing short of an ethnic war similar to the civil war of the 1990s. The departure of ISAF in the near future will afford an opportunity for that conflict. Let's hope that better governance will prevail.
Pictured below is a Kuchi tribe that I photographed in Musahi, Kabul Province in April 2011.
07 July 2011: Little Visitor at My Door:
Hello, Little Friend. Thank you for stopping by my quarters.
4 July 2011: Patriotism and Private Wars.
Today is the Fourth of July. And patriotism is extolled as it should be. Our country was founded on the selfless sacrifices of a myriad of individuals, famous and not so famous, and we remember them on this very important day.
Yet, here in Afghanisan, I am reminded of the importance of remembering the higher ideals of patriotism amid the many personal problems that occur almost daily among soldiers, the type of issues our chaplains deal with often. Too often when I speak to discouraged soldiers or service personnel, the stories are similar: negative personal experiences shape their perceptions of the war, and the very reasons why they are serving. One of my major take aways from studying the Vietnam War was that soldiers too often transferred the negative experiences with their spouses, girlfirends, chain of a command, addictions, and other problems to the war in Vietnam, using that experience as a lens to determine the very validity or lack of validity of the war. Thus a man who got a Dear John Letter concluded the war was not worth fighting. Another Vietnam veteran's conflict with his superiors was so intense that he concluded the same. Yet others faced tragedy at home and carried their angers and pains into the jungles of Southeast Asia. Here in Afghanistan, the stituation is similar. When soldiers are poorly treated, or mismanage the trials of life, they sour on the war and the mission. Their personal life is thus critical.
In sum: It is not about you or me, or the private wars we find ourselves in. The conflict here in Afghanistan is fought against a tyrannical force imposing a totalitarian cleptocracy on a major and strategic region in South Asia. All other issues are subordinate and private and should not interfere with the conduct of the mission.
But let me be sympathetic and acknowledge the seriousness of personal relationships during wartime. I have seen damage done by poor leadership. But this is not the norm but the exception. Any person placed in leadership while in theater should understand this point.
The other side of the coin is to acknowledge how difficult leadership is. We are quick to blame our leadership even though the problems are really ours, or are beyond the scope of our leaders, and thus deserve our support and not complaints.
I have also seen how important support from the homefront encourages those in the field. Those of us with supportive wives know this intimately. On more than a few occassions I have reached back to my military friends who have served for decades, men who have the experience and wisdom to support at critical times. They have also been an enormous help.
As American flags wave here our base in Afghanistan I am reminded of those who sacrificed for our country and won victories big and small. Winning the victory of private wars is essential to winning in the field. For those of us in theater, let us strive to do our part and serve faithfully in both private and national wars.
2 July 2011: Penetrating a Non-Permissive Environment: The INS Pattern in Regional Command North (RC North).
The ability of Insurgent (INS) in Afghanistan to penetrate non-permissive environments, asreas where they are not welcomed by the local populace, is formidable. US military and policymakers should be well aware of this ability, particularly during the peirod of "thinning out" and transition to an Afghan-led security structure. The situation in Regional Command North (RC North) serves as an example. In general, INS are using the following tactics.
1. Manipulation of Mullahs.The backbone of the INS strategy rests upon the Mullahs. Those who are not radical are eliminated by the Taliban and other INS. The extensive networks of these mullahs, their access to the population, ability to form public opinion, and information dominance, all make these Mullahs critical to the INS strategy. INS often train these individuals and then place them in the north or other areas. The payoff is significant for INS.
2. Planting cells in RC North from insurgent ethnics trained in Pakistan and other sanctuaries. Much of the Taliban insurgency has rested on manipulation of Pashtun ethnic grievances and culture. INS have transcended the use of this group and have succeeded in part by training INS from other ethnic groups and then planting them in key areas and regions. Using this leadership approach has allowed groups like the TB to break out of the Pashtun belt and extend the reach of the Quetta Shura.
3. Appealing to youths. Agitating, training, and mobilizing the youth remains a major effort of the Taliban and other insurgents. Dominating their education remains a key objective.
4. Appealing to poor and victimized groups. INS access to, recruitment of, and organization of disfranchised, victimized and impoverished groups and individuals too often succeeds and exploits the seams in governance created corrupt and ineffective security and governance officials in Afghanistan.
5. Penetrating Pashtun enclaves in the North. Penetrating the Pashtun communities in areas dominated by other ethnic groups in Afghanistan is yet another mechanism of the INS. The Taliban have relied on this tactic to varying degrees of success.
6. Patient cellular activity. The aforesaid points reveal a targeting of specific groups by the INS. However, the operational design and pace of the INS in RC North and elsewhere is also significant. We find a finer quality of INS being utilized at present: that is to say, patience. While INS build their small groups (cell structures), little hostile or violence activity is discernible. Later, when these groups emerge, the problem is often more acute and widespread. INS activities in RC North demonstrate this careful planning, cellular activity, and strategic patience. No doubt the INS will reveal their intentions as US Armed Forces thin out and perceived vulnerabilities occur.
The International Crisis Group, “The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland,” 27 June 2011 revealed a disturbing trend in INS activity: a nexus between INS commanders, corrupt Afghan government officials, and organized crime figures that dominate the lucrative underground economies of Afghanistan.
Countering these activities will involve not only more effort, but more will. The battles to secure Afghanistan and its future will be fought on multiple dimensions and fields that transcend the battle field, and include the areas of economics
24 June 2011: The AK 47 Assault Rifle.
Had a chance to fire this superb weapon for the first time, today. Excellent balance, feel, accuracy, and of course, reliability, for which it is famous. The automatic bursts were smooth. What an experience with this quality weapon!
Craig and I above at the range at Camp Julien, Kabul, Afghanistan, 24 June 2011.
23 June 2011: Bring the Boys Home:
The announcement of the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, which will be accomplished over time and with some flexiblity on which forces will leave, marks a major point in the war. The times have changed, and it is now up to the Afghan National Security Forces to carry the load. Their performance varies from location to location. Many factors will determine their success (or failure). Here are some affecting the ANSF:
1. Ideology and patriotism. A sense of pride in purpose, a strength gained from the legitimacy of one's cause coupled with a commitment to it, will be paramount. The Taliban are dedicated, observers have noted, but the dedication is to a vile cause, and the commitment is based on fanatical emotions that shape the very soul of the individual--not the most solid basis for winning a cause. In fact, the latter is a weakness.
2. Training. NTM-A has done an excellent job training the ANSF, and this will not doubt bear fruit.
3. Weaponization: A superiority in firepower and the availabliity of advanced weapons were decisive in the outcome of the Vietnam War. This will again be the case in Afghanistan.
4. Leadership and troop numbers. The leadership of ANSF will be a decisive factor, and therefore encouraging, supporting, supplying, and augmenting ANSF leadership should remain a major mission of Coalition Forces, and US Special Forces in general. Bing West could not have been more right when he advocated embedded advisers (SF) who can motivate the ANSF as well as develop a warrior ethos. And the ANSF needs to continue to grow in capacity and numbers to offset the high recruitment rates of the TB and other INS.
5. Public support. Afghans will need to support their forces. The fact that Afghans are increasingly turning against the TB because it targets civlians will work to the favor of the ANSF. The lack of governance, the corruption, and the poor leadership of President Karzai will be mitigating factors that erode public support for the war. More efforts and success in governance need to occur, but there are some encouraging trends in this area.
6. External influences. On the positive side, international support (INGOs) and Coalition Forces will play a decisve role. International support must remain consistent and the US must prove its "metal" by not abandoning and ally. The disgrace of abandoning Vietnam in its hour of need (post Paris Peace Accords, 1973-1975) was one of the worst moments in American history and one of the greatest failures of the world's greatest nation.
Pakistan will remain the major external influence, and malign influence. As Insurgents (INS) utlize the support, sanctuaries, recruits, and training in Pakistan, that country will play a decisive role as well. The failure of US defense planning to interdict Pakistan's sanctuaries has been one of the most egregioius strategic failures of the war, and may prove fatal to the very existence of Afghanistan as a nation.
President Richard Nixon's words ring true today, as they did in November 1969 on the eve of brining troops home from the Vietnam War.
"We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we know our course was right."
19 June 2011: Talking with the Taliban?
The BBC article link http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13830750 discusses what many of us in Afghanistan have known for a while, the Taliban are talking with the United States Government or the Islamic Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA). What these talks reveal is not disclosed publicly. The fact that the Taliban (TB) want to talk is no surprise. They have emissaries throughout the country that are ready to communicate their message. I was very surprised during one meeting with an important Afghan this year that he said to me: "Would you like to speak with the Taliban?" I declined politely, knowing this is the work of the State Department, and COMISAF (Command, International Security Assistance Force).
But the issues for discussion should be based on the following principles applied to the Taliban:
1. The complete renunciation of violence by the Taliban.
2. The complete disarmament of the Taliban coupled with its complete demobilization as a fighting force.
3. Disassociation with insurgent groups.
4. Incorporation into the Islamic Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA) through acceptance of the Constitution and laws of the state.
5. Accountabilty to the government through local tribal and govenment structures (District level accountabilty). That is to say, tribal, malik, and district level authority will have to play a major role in accountability.
6. Prosecution of violations of the aforesaid agreement.
The United States Government has negotiated with terrorist regimes before, namely the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. The danger in these discussions is never the talking, but the terms of negotiation. More likely than not, the Taliban are attempting to "fight while negotiate" and thus win at the diplomatic table what they could not on the battlefield.
US policymakers should be careful of the following tactics of the TB.
1. Negotiating an early withdrawal of Coalition Forces.
2. Retention of weapons, formations, leadership, and networks, including its logistical support in Pakistan.
3. The implementation of Sharia law as a substitute, encroachment, or compromise to Constitutional law.
4. The political organization of front groups used to infiltrate Parliament and to destroy it from within.
5. Territorial concessions that would allow the TB to have a defacto state or sanctuary in Afghanistan.
Having stated the above, the prospects of negotiating a settlement are not optimistic. The rigid ideology of the TB is forged in minds that not only refuse to honor peace and compromise but believe that fatalistic forces favor these murderous designs of the Insurgents.
Nonetheless, Reintegration of individuals and leaders within the Taliban and other INS remains a viable option. But as long as the Taliban retain sanctuaries in Pakistan, strong financial networks fed from global Islamic networks, and ideological strength fomented in hundreds of madrassas (religious schools) in Pakistan and elsewhere, peace remains a distant goal.
15 June 2011: "One Man's Freedom Fighter Is Another Man's . . .
A common fallacy often spoken among the confused asserts, "One man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist." This statement reflects the confusion and moral ambiguity that darkens the key issues of security: promoting freedom and eliminating terror. The fact that many people cannot differentiate between a terrorist and a freedom fighter is most disturbing. Similarly, the characteristics of both freedom fighters and terrorist are opposites; yet these characteristics are not publicly discussed and known, and thus the confusion is furthered. However, the following truths are evident.
1. Freedom fighters have a principle that is upheld, not a propaganda plan that hides one's beliefs. Insurgents hide their agenda and use propaganda, masterfully disseminated, organized, and implemented. A candid study of all major insurgent groups in the 20th and 21st century reveals that a common tactic is used: the primary ideology is hidden under popular notions of freedom, justice, peace and reform. Freedom fighters do not hide their ideology under popular grievances and issues, only to reveal them later and show that quite the opposite view is embraced. Whether examining the Taliban of Afghanistan, the Shia extremists of Bahrain, or the Communist revolutionaries of the Philippines, the tactic is the same: the real views are hidden and visible only through a deeper study of key issues and ideas below the surface politics.
2. Freedom fighters do not target civilians; only terrorists target civilians. American revolutionaries fought the British and did not target civilians. The modern insurgent makes the targeting of civilians a primary mission. One fact that I am very proud of involves the great efforts that United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Coalition Forces (CF) take to protect civilian life. While the insurgents use human shields, purposely fight in villages and among civilian areas in order to draw fire and create civilian casualties, CF does the opposite. So strict are the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and targeting standards that these guidelines have often placed American lives at risk and granted defacto freedom to insurgents. Yet the point is clear: civilized militaries avoid harming civilians.
Witness the suicide bombings of the Islamic Fundamentalists, the vicious assaults of the Shia of Bahrain on the migrants, students at the University of Bahrain, and the Sunni neighborhoods, and the Communist target killings of Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. The difference between freedom fighters and terrorists could not be wider.
3. Freedom fighters promote freedom, and terrorists and insurgents promote political philosophies of totalitarianism and despotism. Fascists, Communists, or Islamic Fundamentalists all share the same core political doctrine: totalitarianism. Although all these groups differ in perspective, core ideas, and main beliefs, the political means are identical: enslavement. Fascists promoted totalitarianism via the state, Communists through the Party, and Islamists through Sharia law and its councils and Mullahs. Each group seeks to enslave others, stamp out freedom, and place a select elite above the people. Insurgents have totalitarian views at their heart; freedom fighters promote democracy.
4. Freedom fighters promote the preservation of life, and insurgents promote the taking of life. It is that simple. The litmus test is evident in two circumstances: the life of the movement; and the policies implemented after power is achieved. During the American Revolution unity and fraternity dominated the life of the movement, moving historians to note that the unity was among the strongest traits fostering success. After the American revolutionaries attained their objectives, the greatest freedoms, reforms, and civil rights blossomed across the States and expanded through time and distance. Despite some inconsistencies, which diminished with time, the American continent became the most free in world history.
What followed the formation and victories of insurgent groups? The worst killings in human history marked the formation and victory of insurgent groups. The mass killings of Fascists, Communists, and Islamists are among the worst in world history. The first two being the leaders. Yet, in the few instances when Islamic Fascists achieved power, mass killings and terror followed. The Taliban victory over the Soviets served as an example and inaugurated a decade of civil war and conflict.
"One man's freedom fighter should be another man's too," the saying should go. And the convoluted reasoning that justifies terrorism should be exorcised as well. The beliefs and behaviors of the two sides are in eternal conflict and will remain so into the future. But the insurgent need not have a just opponent, only an opportunity. Our job as members of Coalition Forces is to make sure we deny that opportunity and make sure the two worlds (freedom and terrorism) remain distanced.
11 June 2011: Winning the War of the Flea in Afghanistan
"In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws." Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare.
Winning the war in Afghanistan will involve winning the war of the flea, countering the asymmetrical strategy and tactics of the Taliban and its insurgent partners: HiG, Haqqani Network, TTP, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Al Qaeda. The enemy's strategy is not complex; we have been fighting in earnest the war of the flea in areas like Vietnam, Central America, and the Philippines since the end of World War II. We should understand it well by now. The insurgents simply plan and operate under the assumption that they cannot defeat a superior opponent and just need to outlast us, creating the pain, suffering, and expensese that an American public will not tolerate indefinitely and that will result in a US withdrawal.
Some of the lessons learned form over fifty years of fighting insurgencies include:
1. Deny enemy sanctuaries. Once the enemy establishes a protected sanctuary in remote areas or so-called neutral countries, they can rejuvenate indefinitely. Allowing sanctuaries for the enemy is a war losing factor and deserves serious consideration in military planning and operations.
2. Relentlessly pursue the enemy's leadership, operational hubs, concentration of forces, and financial networks. Winning a counterinsurgency involves a lot of interdiction carried out by Special Forces who can pin point these areas.
3. Use effective governance as a means to not only destroy the enemy's ideology (which is based on manipulation of popular grievances) but also as a means to bring real reform and justice.
4. Cultivate homefront and public support by effective information operations based on being first with the truth, and remaining consistent in character and leadership. Insurgent doctrine and practice is based on ruthless expediencies that the public will more often then not reject if quality governance is available as an alternative. Our leaders must demonstrate a quality of character that will inspire imitation not fuel insurgent propaganda.
10 Jun 2011: A Beautiful Land--Afghanistan
The oddity of war is that it is often waged in beautiful lands. Afghanistan is an example of that fact. The country is among the most beautiful that I have visited. I awake to the morning light gracing the majestic mountains that adorn the outskirts of Kabul. The winter brings increased glory to this area as snow capped peaks top sloping formations of earth that only God could have created.
Yet the very area I am speaking of is littered with ruins from previous conflicts. Soviet tanks rusted and mangled speak like ghosts of the darkened past, condemned sentinels standing over the "graveyard of empires" and aborted attempts of history. Bullet holes riddle the Queen's Palace and age this lady who once shared her smile with the green gardens below. Inside the palace the eerie scribbling of Soviet, Taliban, and Tajik guests leave their comments for the future to study but never forget.
Yet many Afghans have hope. And Kabul is a city with a long memory, and one that remembers the 1960s and 1970s when this city was a tourist destination. During this time you could find the young and trendy coming to Afghanistan to find the missing experiences that complete the journey of youth. Others came to find the hashish that made the circuitous route through the alleys of secrecy.
If Afghanistan ever finds the security it longs for, the country will become a tourist destination again. And its streets will no longer carry the militant steps of the Talib but those walking the path of peace.
09 June 2011: Bing West's youtube video on the War in Afghanistan. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xr6_w9NVUgY
Bing West's insights into the war in Afghanistgan are simply unmatched. His over fifty years of experience are evident in the clarity, detail, and logic of his explanations. This youtube video is a short summary of his major views found in his book: The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan. You will notice among the video footage not only the expert words of this great veteran, but also the fact that he is being shot at, is moving along with the troops (Special Forces), and bearing the hardships of the battlefield. No small feat for a man who is 70 years old. [Mel, if you are reading my blog, you could also pull that off.] What is not mentioned in the video is that Mr. West almost died of cholera while working in Afghanistan to find the truths necessary to bring victory in the conflict. If you cannot read the book, I recommend looking at this video and perhaps reading some of his articles.
08 June 2011: Iranian Arms and Support of Insurgents in Afghanistan.
The BBC New article, "Iran's Illegal Arms Trade: 'Hypocritical and Dangerous" highlights the comments of a British official regarding Iran's dissemination of higher grade weaponry to insurgents in Afghanistan, namely the Taliban. The article can be found at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13545621 . The Iranians are simply repeating in Afghanistan what they did in Iraq, providing more advanced and sophisticated weapons to enemies of the United States, who use these weapons to kill, injure, and intimidate United States Forces and its allies and friends. The implementation of Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP), an Iranian version of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), which added the increased lethality of penetrating US uparmored vehicles, caused the death of many Americans.
In 2009-2010 while serving under United States Division-South (formerly called Multi-National Division-South) in Basra, Iraq, many of us noted the active role of Iran in the insurgency. Iran provided sanctuary, planning, aid, funds, weaponry, intelligence, personnel and leadership to terrorist and insurgent groups hostile to Coalition Forces in southern Iraq (the so-called Special Groups). The missiles fired at our base (COB Basra), like so many others fired at US Forces in Iraq, carried the distinct signature of Iran. A consequence of Iranian covert weaponization of insurgents was the increased alienation of southern Iraqis, who considered Iran to be a foreign invader using Iraq to further its designs. It was quite surprising to see the level of anti-Iranian sentiment in the south of Iraq. Despite the many rumors and assessments that the Shia of Iraq were pro-Iranian, the opposite was the case. Many Iraqis candidly told us about their disdain for Iran's meddling in their affairs.
Iran's support to insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan is "a game changer" in that it significantly increases the level of lethality and risk to the security of USFOR-A (United States Forces -Afghanistan) and others. In short: Iran cannot have it both ways, acting as a legitimate international player and simultaneously supporting terrorism globally. US policy leaders should continue to isolate Iran and consider it a hostile power that supports international terrorism.
07 June 2011: Success and Challenges in the War in Afghanistan
The BBC has posted an interesting video entitled "Can the Insurgents Be Defeated in Afghanistan?" Here is the link http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12981618 . The success of Coalition Forces (CF) is evident: increased sweeps and operations have cleared key terrain districts, including Nad Ali in Kandahar Province, which is the subject of the BBC video. The district was previously held by the Taliban, and now is completely under the control of CF.
However, as this video underscores, the challenges are not light. Thus CF Commanders use the terms "fragile" and "reversible" when discussing the gains. The challenges include: an ineffective and corrupt Afghan National Police force, which is often predatory toward the local population, meaning it extorts local nationals; an enemy that is elusive and supported by strong rear areas (sanctuaries) allowing return at a later date and time of their chosing; a neutral population element that is opportunistic, undecided, and at times veiling its hostility. This population dynamic is problematic in the present as it tolerates insurgent freedom of movement (FOM). Moreover, these opportunists amid the population are likely to switch sides if and when the insurgents gain the upper hand.
In sum: the video aptly captures the current victory, the challenges that remain, and the fragility of success. The future in Afghanistan will be determined by the quality of CF strategy and doctrine, the determination of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the quality of national and local governance, and the mobilization of the positive elements of the population.
06 June 2011: Operational Aspects of Night Raids.
The success of Night Raids will depend on the ability of Coalition Forces to operationalize three aspects of the raid: 1. maintaining a brisk tempo and kill and capture rate; 2. "Afghanizing" the raids, having the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) increasingly lead and conduct the raids; 3. Professionalizing the intelligence and cultural understanding of Night Raids so that civilian casualties are significantly reduced. Achieving anyone of these parts is difficult. Achieving all three simultaneously is an even greater challenge. Yet, United States Forces-Afghanistan has the capability and leadership to do that very task.
01 June 2011: Night Raids in Afghanistan.
The issue of Night Raids, the Special Force Operations that kill or capture insurgents, has come under much scrutiny for two reasons. First, they are effective. Counterinsurgency is won (in large part) by neutralizing the command and operational hubs of the enemy. So therefore these successful night raids are terrifying the enemy as well as degrading their capacity to fight. Proof of the success is found in the high profile tactics of the enemy (an indirect and low risk tactic)--the targeting of highly public sites, people, and events with suicide attacks. Simply stated: the enemy is losing the capacity to directly attack Coalition Forces and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and is using every public method and political pressure to have these raids cease.
The second issue is that civilian casualties are causing many to reevaluate the tactic of night raids. The enemy uses civilians as human shields and also directly targets civilians., i.e., killing Afghans who directly or indirectly support us. For instance, some children recently told me that I should not take their picture because if the Taliban found out they would harm them. Also, even when the very best planning takes place, time, terrain, and human error are factors that can cause inaccuracies that cause the death of civilians. This happens in all wars and much less in this one with our advances in technology and operational efficiency.
Many Americans and others may not be aware that the vast majority of civilian casualties are caused by insurgents. But more importantly, if we leave and allow the enemy "to own the field," the barbarity and slaughter will continue as they impose sharia law and seek to exterminate any rival religion or political organization--a civilian casualty catastrophy.
Summary: Night Raids in Afghanistan should and must continue at a vigorous pace to disrupt the enemy's strength, or "center of gravity" as the great military analyst Clausewitz called it. In fact, night raids remove the murderous thugs who kill civilians, and thus the raid saves many lives. Likewise, every effort must be made to avoid civilian casualties and to investigate Civilan Casualty (CIVCAS) cases. As this war increasingly "Afghanizes," the night raids will be executed by the ANSF with US Forces/CF in a supporting role.
-
Strategic Security in Afghanistan: A Current Assessment
Strategic Security in Afghanistan: MAY 2012
Martin Scott Catino, Ph.D.
20 MAY 2012
EXSUM: A comprehensive and durable security framework is necessary for achieving United States strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Although Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have increased in numbers, capabilities, and operability, a uniform Afghan security presence free from major gaps, breaches, and failures operating with minimal Coalition Force (CF) support has yet to be achieved. These deficiencies in security occur both within Regional Commands and between major regions of the country (RC East and RC South for example) and therefore pose significant challenges to the long-term security of Afghanistan.
INTRODUCTION: This assessment is based on the theory that the US effort in Afghanistan will face many of the challenges posed during the Soviet Afghan War. Three major variables that affected the Soviets will challenge, constrain, and circumscribe current US operations in Afghanistan. First, the balance of power vis a vis Insurgent (INS) sanctuaries in Pakistan will remain the critical determinant of security in Afghanistan. Second, security gains will be shaped by ethnic distribution patterns in Afghanistan, an assumption based on past patterns of support or rejection of INS activities. Third, US efforts to achieve security in Afghanistan will be influenced by infrastructure (or the lack thereof) throughout the country, a direct relationship to the remote areas of the country which remain the most unstable. While these variables do not make success impossible, they do pose obstacles that must be overcome in order to achieve the level of security requisite for stability and achieving the strategic aim of denying INS bases and control within Afghanistan.
1. Establishing the northern tier of security in Afghanistan is central to transitioning security responsibilities to ANSF.
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has prioritized building and expanding the security “bubbles” in Regional Command-Capital (RC-C) and Regional Command-East (RC-E) so that these form the core of a northern tier comprised of the linkage of both RCs, and then linkage with the more secure areas of RC-North and RC-West. The consolidation of these key population, government, and economic areas in the north of the country (key terrain) will in theory create a preponderance of security that can be exerted vis-a-vis the more troubled Pashtun regions of southern Afghanistan that have given rise and impetus to the insurgency.
Of historical note, this reconstruction and consolidation of northern Afghanistan was precisely the Soviet strategy during the “anti-Soviet Jihad” of the 1980s. Soviet military planners envisioned an economically and socially reformed northern Afghanistan integrated into the southern tier of the Soviet Union. Given the ethnic similarities of the respective areas, and the need for infrastructure development and development of natural resources, the plan was feasible and had some initial success.
The key population centers and communication hubs near Kabul and eastern Afghanistan were central to Soviet security strategy. US strategy will differ in that the Panshir Valley, the home of Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud will not be as volatile as that found in the Soviet Afghan War, when Massoud and his forces effectively resisted repeated Soviet incursions into the area.
2. The southern tier of security (RC-South; and RC Southwest) continues to lag behind the rate of progress of the northern tier, and has not yet developed the linkage with it requisite for establishing comprehensive security in Afghanistan.
RC-South (Kandahar Province) and RC-Southwest (Helmand River Valley) have not developed the internal security of the respective Regional Commands (mainly because of insecurity in the rural areas) requisite for expanding their security bubbles. Although considerable gains in security have occurred in the south, some of the most secure areas (Marjah District for instance) continue to indicate successful insurgent operations measured by the persistence of attacks as well as the redundancy of CF operations (the need to repeatedly conduct Clearing operations in areas that have previously been Cleared).
Linking RC-S/RC-SW to the northern tier remains a significant problem. Currently, the challenges to security are due to INS prioritization of this area, and a variety of governance and economic problems. But more importantly, INS support remains strongest in Pashtun dominated areas where ethnic and cultural affinities with the Taliban are more viable.
Security has improved in Kandahar province, with less success in rural areas. The provinces linking RC South with the north (Zabol, Ghazni, Wardak, and Logar) contain some of the most unstable areas, valleys, and locations in Afghanistan, rife with insurgent activity exacerbated by poor governance, and inadequate infrastructure.
3. ISAF has relied upon an active defense as the primary means of defending and securing the people of Afghanistan. This active defense has not yet reached the capacity, capability, or flexibility to counter the INS threat to security.
In order for an active defense to succeed, a comprehensive, integrated, and uniform security structure must be created in degree symmetrical to the security threat, internal and external.
The strength of insurgent capabilities in Pakistan (sanctuary, command and control, financing, mobility, mobilization of resources, weapons procurement and manufacturing), and innumerable “rat lines” into Afghanistan (used for multi-directional movement) requires a uniform security to counterbalance these INS capabilities.
In addition to the inadequacy in capacity, ANSF has not developed the capabilities and flexibility to counter insurgent attacks, which continue to operate asymmetrically, effectively targeting the breaches, pockets, weaknesses, and failures in security.
US challenges to developing security in Afghanistan will not differ significantly from those found in the Soviet Afghan War of the 1980s. The strength of INS sanctuary in Pakistan, the degree of ethnic cooperation with Coalition Forces or conversely INS, and the lack of infrastructure will all play a major part in shaping the security outcomes in Afghanistan. On an encouraging note, even though many observers of Afghan Army capabilities predicted the immediate collapse of the Najibullah government after Soviet withdrawal, the reverse occurred. Afghan Army capabilities proved effective enough to not only operate independently from Soviet combat forces, but also outlived the very Soviet Union which had in large part created these capabilities. Despite the major deficiencies in manpower, area control, and uniformity, the Afghan Army proved remarkably effective.
-
Remembering COL Lansdale
In the Midst of Wars
Martin Scott Catino, Ph.D.
27 May 2011
Colonel Edward Lansdale entered the post-World War II era with a determination and grit that later would make him famous. Although vilified as the “ugly American” by an anti-war generation resenting Cold War commitments, he nevertheless remains a hero in military circles, which honor his sacrifices and his understanding of insurgent psychology. COL Lansdale is a historical monument to the character necessary to defeat guerrilla movements. His development of psychological operations in the Philippines and Vietnam made history, but his inflexible resolve against Communism demonstrated the clarity and firmness of mind necessary for all leaders who face similar fights into the future.
But even COL Lansdale would have been taxed by the diversity and complexity of revolutions and insurgencies taking place in the Mideast today. In the Midst of Wars, the Colonel’s insightful account of his service, aptly frames the outbreak of “wars of national liberation” (Communist insurgencies) that occurred like a virus, plaguing not just the “third world” but also Europe and nations on the other side of the Atlantic. Even the United States had to fight at home (dare I say counterinsurgency). The Black Panthers, who embraced Maoist Communism and urban insurgent tactics, violently challenged “the man,” calling for an armed black community to repel the police who entered these communities “as an occupying foreign force.” The not so Ugly American knew that these “popular revolts” of his era were not popular, but orchestrated and agitated by Communist tyrants who had honed their tactics to a science during World War II. While serving in Vietnam he noted the commonality in the insurgencies he had seen:
“I had only a smattering of French so I relied heavily on interpreters, sign-language, and a pocket dictionary. The people were strikingly different from the Filipinos, but the guerrilla methods of the Communists were all too familiar. . . .” (Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 373-373).
However, there is no commonality in unrest now erupting in the Mideast. United States political and military leaders currently find themselves in the midst of wars without any central tendencies that would allow an easy paradigm of understanding. The conflict and unrest occurring the Middle East at present demonstrates a variety of motives, leadership, political ideology, and organizations. And understanding these differences will be the key to understanding the very nature of these conflicts, the implication for US security, and whether intervention is an option.
Nevertheless, United States foreign and security policy leaders should not jettison the Cold War lessons learned from COL Lansdale’s era but find flexible ways to apply them to current conflict scenarios.
Here are some lessons learned from Lansdale’s era that are relevant for today.
1. Avoid the rush to intervention and only act when it is in America’s interests.Often global opinion has no regard for America’s national security needs, or economic interests. Many people (including leaders) the world over think the United States is omnipotent and self sufficient and thus without any legitimate interests. These international pressures force America into the role as giver and never taker. Therefore the responsibility of advocating for America’s legitimate interests falls directly on Washington. That responsibility must be clearly understood and undertaken in international affairs. America’s role as humanitarian and leader of the free world must be balanced against its role as protector and advocate of the American people. If US policymakers are not cognizant of this fact, they can easily be led into every major conflict that occurs across the Mideast or elsewhere, or into too many conflicts, and thus exhaust our strength and weakening our power for when it may be needed most.
2. Manage the conflictive global pressures regarding intervention and non intervention. Intervention is never an easy or light path to take. Global opinion chides the United States for imperialism when it intervenes, and chides again when the United States does not intervene, calling the world’s only superpower “cold” and “irresponsible.” This was the case during the Rwanda genocide of 1994. US policymakers must carefully examine when we should intervene. And once we commit to that difficult task, expect and brave the hardships until the mission is complete.
3. Remember the first rule of warfare: Wars tend to escalate. Carl von Clausewitz, the famous Prussian military theorist, aptly summed the chief dynamics of war:
“War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes…To introduce the theory of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity.”(Clausewitz, On War, 76.)
The temptation to intervene militarily in areas that appear to be no match for American or NATO forces (i.e., Libya) could be problematic. Even if a Western victory is all but assured, an escalation of conflict is likewise certain. Unless the United States is ready, willing, and able to face the escalation, it should not intervene. The cost of a precipitous withdrawal need not be amplified here. But the lessons of early withdrawal from Vietnam and Lebanon should be remembered.
4. Remember that home front support is essential for victory and must be cultivated actively.The laissez faire approach to home front support is a sure road to defeat. A major lesson learned from the Vietnam War was that the American people were not aptly informed, instructed, and reached with the news and information regarding that conflict. While North Vietnam and its Communist supporters sought to exploit every opportunity possible to dominate media information, the United States leadership did little. For example, Washington should have brought Ngo Dinh Diem and other Vietnamese leaders to the United States to state their cause to the American people. The failed opportunity left and information gap that the radical Left, as well as the Communist forces, aptly exploited. The erosion of public support for the Vietnam War was related directly to the misinformation and disinformation generated through the Left. We cannot afford another mistake of this nature.
5. Remember the financial costs of warfare and be ready to address them. The high costs of wars have bankrupted empires and nations, and serve as pivotal lessons for the United States. Acting from false guilt and a fear of appearing imperialistic, the US has undertaken the costly task of nation building in Afghanistan and Iraq, yet refuses to take compensation from these countries. In the future, Washington will not have the luxury of such a course of action. Either countries that need American intervention will have to give of their natural resources as payment (i.e., oil and minerals) or will have to face their problems on the cheap, without American intervention.
6. Support our allies and keep our global commitments.Do not allow our soft power incentives to become more beneficial than those given to our allies. Another lesson from COL Lansdale’s era is to remember to support America’s allies and keep one’s commitments. The foreign policy aim of using soft power (i.e., economic investment, trade incentives, and market access) to sway belligerent and alienated nations to soften or embrace the West has limits. Too often economic incentives harden rather than soften a belligerent’s resolve and lead the United States into the trap of giving more attention, support, and aid to its enemies than its friends. Case in point: the best way to gain billions of dollars in American aid is to foment conflict while appealing to US intervention. We, as Americans, should not make belligerency a profitable undertaking.
Had General Lansdale (he was later promoted to the rank of Major General) lived to see our day, no doubt he would have seen the increased complexity of modern insurgencies. His understanding of the nature of insurgencies would have to change in order to keep abreast of the flexible tactics and complex background of each conflict. Yet the principles he and other Cold Warriors embraced would remain relevant and useful for the present.
The United States and West won the Cold War and defeated global insurgencies because of many strengths. These principles of warfare were among the most important strengths and remain timeless in their application.
Martin Scott Catino, Ph.D. currently serves as a senior military adviser in Afghanistan.