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I've been playing around with my computer's speech recognition program. I've finally given up on it in disgust. Either I have some kind of speech impediment, or I just need to work with it a little more, or it could be completely f***ed up beyond any kind of belief. The mistakes that it makes would be comical if I wasn't using it for such serious work (such as transcribing the conclusions for the "damaging" Phase 2 report that the Democrats released earlier this year). Between having to go back and correct at least one quarter of everything I dictate and the program sometimes not even hearing what I say in the first place, there's a whole lot of frustration.
(As well as some new words being added to the computer's dictionary.)
I finally realized that I could type all of the conclusions that were on the Phase 2 "damaging" report faster and more accurately than the speech recognition could. As you read this, realize that I tried to catch as many mistakes as I could, but I think a few slipped by me. If something doesn't read right, your best bet is to compare it to the original. Be aware, as I've said many times, that this report is in PDF format, which means that if you have a slow connection and open it up online, it may take awhile to download and/or open. If you want to read all of the statements that each conclusion is talking about, find a copy on line. I have, as I mentioned above, copied all of the conclusions here, however, so that you don't necessarily need to read those statements. All of those conclusions are here, conveniently at your fingertips.
There are sixteen (16) in all. I've included every word not only with each conclusion, but any relevant paragraphs following that conclusion. There are also a few interesting paragraphs that I threw in there, free of charge.
Keep in mind that the bulk of the report is made up of quotes from President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and a whole host of other Administration officials. You can read the report to find out what these quotes were; I'm not going to reproduce them here. The Committee selected them because they thought they were representative. I'll let you decide for yourself on that score.
I will, however, let you see how I arrived at my conclusion that this report isn't as "damaging" to the Bush Administration as the Democrats and anti-war people would have you believe. So, without further ado, here they are:
(U) Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community.
Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that reconstitution was not underway, and the Department of Energy, which argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program.
(U) Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq's possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories were substantiated by intelligence information.
Intelligence assessments from the 1990's through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more. Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments left open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq's biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE.
(U) Conclusion 3: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq's possession of chemical weapons were substantiated by intelligence information.
Intelligence assessments, including the December 2000 ICA stated that Iraq had retained up to 100 metric tons of its chemical weapons stockpile. The October 2002 NIE provided a range of 100 to 500 metric tons of chemical weapons.
(U) Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq's chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community's uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing.
The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing.
Postwar Findings
(U) The Committee reported on postwar findings on Iraq's chemical weapons program in its September 2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. The Committee found the following:.
(U) Following the war, the Iraq Survey Group conducted its review of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and found that there "were no caches of CW munitions and no single rounds of CW munitions." Additionally, "the ISG has high confidence that there are no CW present in the Iraqi inventory." 81 Some pre-1991 chemical weapons munitions have been found since the end of the combat operations.
(U) The ISG found no credible evidence indicating Iraq resumed its chemical weapons program after 1991, but said that "Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable." 82
(U) The ISG investigated whether Iraq had intended to produce chemical weapons through its civilian chemical industry. It found that Iraq had an inherent capability to use its civilian industry for sulfur mustard CW agents, but did not find any production units that had been configured to produce CW agents or key chemical precursors. The ISG found that Iraq did not have a capability to produce nerve agents. 83
81 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, Chemical Section at p. 123.
82 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, Chemical Section at p. 1 and 97
83 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, Chemical Section at p. 25.
(U) Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction were generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many statements made regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher level of certainty that the intelligence judgments themselves.
Many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding production and expressed some room for doubt about whether production was ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing any weapons of mass destruction.
(U) Conclusion 6: The Secretary of Defense's statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information.
While many intelligence analysts suspected that the Iraqi government might be using underground facilities to conceal WMD activities, no active underground WMD facilities had been positively identified. Furthermore, none of the underground government facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe from conventional airstrikes.
_____________________
102 National Intelligence Council, Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National Security, November 2002.
103 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002.
104 CIA assessment, DO Memorandum Intelligence Report, [title redacted], February 12, 2003.
105 CIA DO Memorandum Intelligence Report, [title redacted], February 12, 2003.
106 CIA DO Memorandum Intelligence Report, [title redacted], March 3, 2003.
(U) Conclusion 7: Statements in the major speeches and additional statements analyzed regarding Iraqi ballistic missiles were generally substantiated by available intelligence.
The intelligence community was consistent in its judgments that the Iraqi military possessed a small number of Scud-type missiles left over from the Gulf War era (although the October 2002 NIE noted that these judgments were based on accounting gaps rather than direct evidence), and that Iraq was developing short-range missiles whose range exceeded the range permitted under UN sanctions by as much as 150 km, or 93 miles. The community also judged that Iraq was pursuing the capability to build longer-range missiles, but assessed that this project was still at the early stages of development.
(U) Conclusion 8: Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons were generally substantiated by intelligence information, but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community.
The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UAV program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UAV was probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq "may" be modifying UAV's for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was "not sufficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so."
(U) Conclusion 9: The President's suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003.
The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that an Iraqi procurement network had attempted to purchase commercial mapping software that included data on the United States, and said that this suggested that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to target the US. The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability.
(U) Conclusion 10: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, , as well additional statements, regarding iraq's support for terrorist groups other than Al qaida were substantiated by intelligence information.
The intelligence community reported regularly on iraq's safe harbor and financial support for Palestinian rejection is groups, the Abu Nidal organization, and others. The February 2002 NIE fully supported the claim that Iraq had, and will continue, to support terrorist groups.
(U) Conclusion 11: the statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu musab al-Zarqawi and other al-Qu'ida -related terrorist members were substantiated by the intelligence assessments.
Intelligence assessments noted Zarqawi's presence in Iraq and his ability to travel and operate within the country. The intelligence community generally believe that Iraqi intelligence must be known about, and therefore least tolerated, Zarqawi's presence in the country.
(U) Conclusion 12: statements and implications by the president and secretary of state suggesting that Iraq and al-Qu'ida a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qu'ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by these intelligence.
Intelligence assessments, including multiple CIA reports and in November 2002 NIE, dismissed the claim that Iraq and al-Qu'ida were cooperating partners. According to an undisputed INR footnote in the NIE, there was no intelligence information that supported claim that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to al-Qu'ida. The credibility of the principal intelligence source behind a claim that Iraq provided al-Qu'ida with biological and chemical weapons training was regularly questioned DIA, and later by the CIA. The Committee repeats its conclusion from the prior report that "assessments were inconsistent regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training to al-Qu'ida".
(U) conclusion 13: statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq's contacts with al-Qu'ida were substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers'statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qu'ida.
(U) Conclusion 14: The intelligence community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met in Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001.
Postwar findings
(U) The Committee issued a number of conclusions in its September 2006 report, Postwar bindings about Iraq's WMD programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with Prewar assessments, relating to the pre-war links between Iraq and terrorism. The committee found the following:
(u) Iraq in al-Qu'ida did not have a cooperative relationship. Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qu'ida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al-Qu'ida to provide material or operational support
(U) most of the contact cited between Iraq and al-Qu'ida before the war by the intelligence community and policymakers have been determined not to have occurred. One of the reported contacts have been confirmed, into other meetings have since been identified.
(U) Postwar information supports pre-war assessments and statements that Abu musab al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad and al-Qu'ida was present in Northern Iraq.
(U) No postwar information has been found that indicates Iraq provide a chemical and biological weapons training to al-Qu'ida. The detainee who provided the key pre-war reporting of office training recanted his claims are for the war. In 2004, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted his earlier statements about biological and chemical weapons training. Al-Libi told debriefers that he had fabricated information while in U.S. custody to receive better treatment and in response to threats of being transferred to a foreign intelligence which he believed would torture him. He also said it later, while he was being debriefed by a foreign intelligence service, he fabricated more information in response to physical abuse and threats of torture. The committee's pryor report compost were finding cited a CIA officer who explain that while CIA believes that al-Libi barricaded information, the CIA cannot determine whether, or what portion of, the original statements or the later recants are true or false.
(U) intelligence gathered after the war has lead analyst to doubt that Mohammed Atta and meetings with Iraq officially in the Czech Republic. According to the committee's prior report, " most were finding support CIA's January 2003 assessment, which judge that 'the most reliable reporting casts doubt' on one of the leads, an alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta and in Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague, and confirm that no such meeting occurred".
(U) Conclusion 15: Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information.
The October 2002 national intelligence estimate assessments about Saddam Hussein did not have nuclear weapons, and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks the U.S. using conventional, chemical or biological weapons at that time, in part because he feared that doing so would give us a stronger case for war with Iraq. This judgment was echoed by vote earlier and later intelligence committee assessment. All of these assessments noted that gauging Saddam's intentions was quite difficult, and most suggested that he would be more likely to initiate hostilities if he felt that a U.S. invasion was imminent.
(U) Conclusion 16: Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the post war situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, economic, do not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products.
There were relatively few intelligence products on the subject prior to January 2003, and senior policymakers did not requested. The committee recognizes that there were many other sources of information available to policymakers that would inform their views about postwar Iraq. The committee did not explore these other sources as it is beyond the scope of this report.
Okay, so there you have it. All 16 conclusions.
"All right, Kaptain," I hear you ask, "but how did you come to the conclusion that this isn't as damaging to the Bush Administration as we have been led to believe?"
Well, that's a darn good question. Let me answer that by listing all of the conclusions that were generally substantiated, those that were generally not substantiated, and others.
Let's start with the ones that were generally substantiated. In order, those were statements that asserted that there was:
--- a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program
--- Iraq's possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories
---Iraq's possession of chemical weapons
---Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction
---Iraqi ballistic missiles
---Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons
---the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to attack the United States
---iraq's support for terrorist groups other than Al qaida
---that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu musab al-Zarqawi and other al-Qu'ida -related terrorist members
---Iraq's contacts with al-Qu'ida were substantiated by intelligence information
All (ALL!) of the above statements were found to be substantiated. Notice, that doesn't necessarily mean that the statements were true. It just means that there was overwhelming evidence at the time to believe that the statements were true.
Let's look at that list. My, there certainly are a lot of claims by those Eeeeeeevil Republicans and right-wingers that are on that list! Most notably, that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction and that Iraq was a sponsor of terrorism, and had links to al-Qu'ida.
So tell me again about how "Bush lied, people died"?
Next, let's look at the one conclusion that is a bit tricky. That conclusion is:
---Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq's chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community's uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing.
The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing.
Kind of a tricky conclusion. It's phrased differently than the other conclusions, so that is one red flag there. Need help translating that? Here, let's put it this way:
The intelligence community could not say for certain whether or not Iraq was producing chemical weapons and hiding said weapons.
Chalk that one up as a tie.
Now, let's look at the statements that were not substantiated by the evidence. These were:
---the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because they were underground and deeply buried
---that Iraq and al-Qu'ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qu'ida with weapons training
---The intelligence community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met in Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001 (There's some debate about this one. I'm including it here just to be fair. Notice the wording does not say that Atta definitely wasn't in Prague. It just says that they can not confirm that he was. The British government, however, continues to stand by the conclusion that Atta was in Prague at the time, and he did meet an Iraqi intelligence officer.)
---Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States
---post war situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, economic, do not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products
Okay, so we look at these five conclusions and we see that the first one and last one are not really very damaging to the Bush Administration's case. I've already discussed the third one and why it really isn't all that damaging. What do we have left? That Iraq and al-Qu'ida didn't have a partnership, and that Saddam wasn't going to give his WMD's to terrorist groups for them to use against us or our allies.
But, from the list above we have already ascertained that:
1) Iraq had WMD's
2) Iraq had intentions to use those WMD's against us and/or our allies if he could
3) Iraq supported terrorist groups
4) Iraq had already given aid and comfort to members of al-Qu'ida
and
5) Iraq had had contact with al-Qu'ida. (which makes sense, given #4 there)
What would your conclusion be, given the above facts?
Well, if you are a sane, rational adult with full cognitive facilities, you believe that it is better to assume that somebody who hates you is going to do anything they can to hurt you, and you need to take steps to protect your self. If, on the other hand, you have Bush Derangement Syndrome, you think that Bush lied.
Try again, losers.
****edit: this is not to imply that you, the person reading this, is a loser. Only those who mindlessly drone that tired old crap that "Bush lied, people died" are the intended targets.
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Posted by Kaptain_Krude on 2008-07-14 20:24:50 | Rating: | Views: 48
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