This essay was written in 2007.

The Abu Sayyaf1 is a group of a few hundred heavily armed men based in the islands of Basilan and Sulu in southern Mindanao, third largest island of the Philippines. The name is derived from that of Professor Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an Afghan intellectual who preached Wahabi or Wahabism, an ultra-conservative Islamist ideology. It has been aptly described as a “CIA-created monster that had gone berserk” (Santuario, n.d.) In a privilege speech delivered before the Philippine Senate on July 31, 2000, Senator Aquilino Pimentel noted that before the kidnapping of foreign tourists by this group, “the Abu Sayyaf had already been blazing a bloody trail of murders, abductions, rapes, mutilations, arsons, and other heinous crimes that is impossible to match in terms of callous cruelty by any armed band of hooligans locally or even internationally.” Pimentel cited an observation by Cooley that the Abu Sayyaf is “the most violent and radical Islamist group in the Far East, using its CIA and ISI [Pakista’s intra-military directorate for intelligence services] training to harass, attack, and murder Christian priests, wealthy non-Muslim plantation owners and merchants and local government [officials] in the southern Philippine Island of Mindanao.” (Pimentel, 2000).

Nobody knows the actual strength of the Abu Sayyaf.2 Of late, the Philippine military has placed their strength at about “400 to 450”, following encounters with the Philippine military that left scores of the terror group dead or wounded (Inquirer, 2007, 2). Its original members, recruited and trained by the CIA to fight America’s surrogate wars, were among the 35,000 Muslim militants from 40 countries who engaged the Soviet army in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s. Most of these young moujahideens or volunteer Muslim warriors came from the Muslim areas in war-torn Mindanao where two rebel groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), demanding secession and the establishment of an independent Bangsa Moro Republic, have been waging a protracted war with the Philippine military since the Marcos years.

From their base in Beshawar, Pakistan, most of the surviving, battle-tested moujahideens returned to Mindanao after the Russians pulled out from Afghanistan in 1989; the rest were recruited by various Islamic fundamentalists. From this core group was born the Abu Sayyaf. Its principal organizer was Abdurajak Janjalani, who was killed in 1999 in an encounter with the police. His brother Khadafy Janjalani, a charismatic young man, took over the leadership of the ASG, but he was also killed later. As members of the ASG operated in the fringes of Muslim-controlled territory, they were recruited by some leaders of the Philippine Army to spy on the MILF and the MNLF. Some of their supposed handlers included top-ranking officers of the Philippine army, the Marines, and the Philippine National Police.

Whatever its goals, the Abu Sayyaf (known also as ASG or Abu Sayyaf Group) announced its existence to the world by fire and destruction on April 4, 1994, as it swooped down on the sleepy town of Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, burning houses, and killing and inflicting mayhem on the unarmed inhabitants.3 The Abu Sayyaf eventually developed its own agenda independent of its controllers: it found out that kidnapping for ransom was lucrative and relatively easy to execute. From neighboring Sipadan, Malaysia, the Abu Sayyaf took hostages: men, women, and children, mostly non-Muslims, including a Filipino priest who was later beheaded.4

The ASG’s link with al-Qaeda has been suspect from the very beginning of its existence. The moujahideens who fought in the Afghanistan jihad knew Osama-Bin Laden as among their stalwart supporters. The US State Department itself has labelled the Abu Sayyaf a “foreign terrorist organization” which once received funding from the al-Qaeda network (Tribune, 2006). Pimentel pointed to the obvious link between the Abu Sayyaf and the al-Qaeda: “Soon after the kidnapping of the Sipadan tourists, the kidnappers who had proclaimed themselves as members of the Abu Sayyaf announced that one of their demands was the release of Ramzi (implicated with bin Laden as one of the bombers of the World Trade Center) from US prison. As above-stated, the Abu Sayyaf name was inspired by a Wahabi preacher. The Abu Sayyaf, presumably, have been indoctrinated into Wahabism, which promotes anti-West ideology.5 Moreover, the Philippine National Police has tagged the ASG responsible for several bomb attacks, of which the most serious was the bombing of a Super Ferry vessel that killed many people (Jacinto, 2006).

In the jungles of Basilan and Sulu, the ASG can operate with almost total impunity. Pursuing government troops find their quarry quite elusive, disappearing in the shadows cast by the thick canopy of the forest within seconds upon sight. They have proved a wily, relentless enemy, even to the highly trained Filipino scout rangers, many of whom have been killed in fierce encounters with the band. But perhaps the ASG’s most vital asset is the sympathy of the local population. When pursued, an ASG member can easily conceal his weapons and take refuge in the house of a local. When in town, he can easily blend with the crowd. A disturbing revelation about the ASG, which was the subject of Senator Pimentel’s speech, is its alleged connivance with some top-ranking officers of the Philippine military and police, although denied by them.

When the ASG first surfaced, it was generally thought this was just a group of outlaws that kidnapped non-Muslim civilians for ransom. “Lost commands”, after all, are the usual culprits blamed by both the Muslim rebels and the military whenever some armed groups take to banditry. The MILF and the MNLF are always quick to denounce and disown such groups so as not to downplay their status on the peace negotiating table as belligerents waging a just cause. However, there have been persistent reports that territories of the MILF and the MNLF serve as sanctuaries of ASG members on the run. There are likewise reports that the said groups have entered into a tactical alliance with the ASG and are actually coddling the latter despite their denials. If true, this spells further trouble for the Philippine government and the ASG’s potential targets.
Most ASG members are in their early twenties. Not every Abu Sayyaf is illiterate; Commander Global who had been captured had a college education. From him, we have a faint idea of the ASG’s motivation and goals: “only governance based on the Shari’ah, and a return to the strict moral precepts of Islam, would be workable for the Muslims.” (Mustafa, 2000). The leaders, at least, lay claim to being devout Muslims.6
The ASG gained international notoriety when it abducted seventeen Filipinos and three American tourists from the Dos Palmas beach resort in Palawan on May 27, 2001 . Among them were missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham. The hostages were kept in captivity for several months, most of them on the run. Gracia Burnham, who would later be rescued by scout rangers, wrote about their 376-day ordeal in her book “In the Presence of My Enemies” where she also mentioned the alleged connivance of top-ranking military men with the Abu Sayyaf.

The ASG demanded enormous ransoms from their captors.7 Although based in the mountains, the ASG maintained a high profile, and with their loot went on a buying spree, giving priority to high-powered armament. It allowed media to interview its spokesman, the flamboyant Abu Sabaya whose trademark Oakleys and scarf became standard newspaper and TV features. Journalists not only had to endure the rigorous trek to the jungle hide-outs; they also had to pay “talent fees” to be granted interviews or for entering the camps. Like spoiled brats newly aware of their power, they once demanded that Robin Padilla, a popular movie actor turned Muslim, to intercede for the hostages.8

The outlaws again stole the limelight when a dozen preachers led by a popular TV evangelist entered their stronghold in a mission to “save” them for Christ. The missionaries were themselves taken hostages and kept captive for several months before they were rescued by the military.9

The brazenness of the ASG is seen in their treatment of captives, a European hostage later confessed that the women were raped by the Abu Sayyaf during their captivity. At one point, women journalists were forbidden to enter the lair of the ASG for fear they would not be spared. A woman journalist who was among the Sipadan hostages described her captivity as “six months in hell”. She said: “Members of the Abu Sayyaf are rude. Even their young companions shouted at us.”

Even in prison, an unarmed Abu Sayyaf poses a constant threat to security. A jailbreak attempt in 2004 resulted in a crisis when ASG inmates killed a jailguard and took hostage the other prisoners. Armed only with a handgun and knives, the three ASG inmates and others died fighting heavily armed SWAT troopers, killing one of them.

At present, the Philippine military claims that the ASG is a spent force, and its days are numbered. But President Arroyo had made the same announcement in 2002 when the ASG was cornered in a Basilan hospital with their Sipadan hostages, saying the group was finished. Incredibly, the beleaguered terrorists escaped the ring of troops and tanks, taking with them most of their hostages. The Philippine military had likewise announced a deadline for finishing off the Abu Sayyaf; with no conclusive results, it has been forced to extend the deadline.

Under pressure from the United States to enact an anti-terror bill, the Philippine Senate has passed a landmark anti-terror bill, due to take effect in May 2007 after it is signed into law by President Arroyo. Besides imposing stiff prison terms for convicted terrorists, detention of suspects for three days without charges, wiretapping, and monitoring of bank accounts, the act provides for the outlawing of suspected terror groups like the Abu Sayyaf (Labog-Javellana, 2007, 2).

Although some of its top commanders have been either killed or captured, the remnant of the Abu Sayyaf have evaded pursuit, surfacing every now and then to waylay government troops. With their rigorous training and war experience, combined with their native ferocity, ruthlessness and cunning, the Abu Sayyaf has emerged a most lethal terrorist group in the world today. It has become even more dangerous because of its links with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian wing. Its terroristic activities are presently limited to some areas in Mindanao but with the training provided by JI and foreign funding from international terror networks, it can easily develop the capability to sow terror in urban Manila and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The Philippines, observes Torre, “is an ideal place for hatching deadly plans against the United States and its Western allies.” (2007, 2). The Abu Sayyaf is far from being a spent force.




Notes
1Literally, in Arabic, “Father (or “Bearer”) of the Sword.”
2A hostage who had lived with the Abu Sayyaf for six months estimated there were about 200 of their captors, but only eighty were fully armed; the rest were very young cadres.
3Scuttlebutt had it that the ASG raiders used military equipment and logistics during the raid, that it was a diversion to take away the public ire from the hanging of a Filipina maid in Singapore, then a bitter national issue.
4Decapitation is a trademark of the ASG. Guillermo Sobero, an American hostage was killed in this manner, as were several soldiers whom they killed during firefights or ambushes.
5A subcommittee on terrorism in the US Senate has cited FBI testimony that massive funds from the Middle East have been channeled to institutions that promoted Wahabism, and these were being used by sleeper cells of the al-Qaeda in about 40 states (Worldtribune 2003).
6Scout rangers who killed Abu Soliman, a top ASG commander said they were drawn to the terrorist camp by a voice raised in Muslim prayers (Inquirer, 2007).
7There were unconfirmed reports the negotiators bloated the amount of ransom and kept a lion’s share for themselves.
8Padilla obliged but only succeeded in bringing home a small girl while the kidnappers not only got a rare high meeting their idol in person; they proved themselves the real stars of the show.
9The rigors of captivity proved too much for their leader who suffered a stroke.














REFERENCES
“Adam links Saudi funds to US sleeper cell network”. 02 March 2007.
“4 Abu members killed; new group leader eyed”. Philippine Daily Inquirer. 06 March 2007.
“American appears in RP court v. Abu Sayyaf kidnappers”. 29 July 2004.
“Army nabs top Sayyaf leader in Zamboanga”. 02 March 2007.
Jacinto, Al. “Troops capture Abu Sayyaf member in Basilan island”. 02 April 2006.
Labog-Javellana, “Antiterror bill becomes law today”. Philippine Daily Inquirer. 06 March 2007. 2.
Mustafa, Noralyn. “Low Profile Intellectual Behind Abu Sayyaf Group: Commander Global. 03 March 2007.